Ecuadorean President Daniel Noboa moved quickly to impose the rule of law immediately after his surprise election victory in 2023. In the short-term, the results of the country’s youngest ever leader were impressive, including a reported 18% decline in murder in 2024. The president’s administration also reportedly increased drug seizures by over 30% – up from 188 tons in 2023 to 250 tons last year. Despite what some observers describe as a year of chaos, this has made him popular among many Ecuadorians.
A central thrust of the president’s tough-on-crime strategy involves the imposition of states of emergency and the consolidation of security institutions under his control. Launched in early January 2024, the so-called Bloque de Seguridad strategy integrates the police, armed forces and ministries of interior and national defence. Prisons have also been declared “security zones” and are firmly under the control of the police and military. The president promises to do more of the same if he is re-elected on Feb. 9, 2025.
The risks of militarized security
While the militarization of public security has helped reduce sky-high homicide rates, this is only part of the story. Incidents of extortion and kidnapping actually increased last year, suggesting that far from being dismantled, several criminal organizations may be changing their tactics. The head of the national agency responsible for fighting violent crime, DINASED, claims that criminal groups are diversifying into new illicit economies in order to survive.
One of the limitations of the Ecuadorian government’s response to organized crime is the absence of preventive measures to keep young people from joining criminal groups in the first place. While there is ample support to crack down on criminals, there is appetite for social, educational, and economic initiatives to encourage at-risk to avoid crime altogether. If there is any home of weakening the structures and networks of crime in the longer-term, more comprehensive strategies are needed.
Another concern is that militarized security responses could give rise to new armed groups, including paramilitaries. While there is still limited evidence of paramilitary activity in Ecuador, the risk is real. Afterall, there is a tradition of so-called “autodefense” and “militia” across the Americas. Meanwhile, researchers have documented over 160 “criminal sanctuaries” (especially in the country’s Guayas and Esmeraldas provinces) where local gangs offer protection in return for “law and order”.
A related worry among analysts is that harsh crackdown on criminal groups while improving some aspects of public security, may unintentionally contribute to structural transformation of the organized crime landscape. In Ecuador, as in other parts of Latin America, the risks appear to be particularly acute within the prison system itself. Indeed, over the past five years, criminal groups embedded in the penitentiary system have expanded operations nationwide.
As in countries like Colombia and Mexico, Ecuador’s criminal networks are using violence to coerce and corrupt local politicians. In some cases, crime groups force local authorities to pay them in return for “protection”.